What are the main features of intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as theories of European integration and how do they differ
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Intergovernmentalism was put forward by Hoffman (1964, 1966) as a response to the neofuncationalist approach to European integration. The three main components to Hoffman’s critique are follows:
1 According to Hoffman, European integration had to be viewed within a global context. Regional integration was seen by Hoffman to be only one aspect of global development.
2 The government of EU member countries were by Hoffman as being a powerful ‘actor’ in the process of European integration. The national states were guided by their own ‘national interest’.
3 If the national interest of states coincided with one another, governments according to Hoffman would accept some form of integration if it involved the ‘technical functional sectors’. However, this integration would not spread into areas, which are regarded as being part of the ‘high politics’ arena.
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Liberal intergovernmentalism just as intergovernmentalism was developed as a critique of neofunctionalism. It was put forward by Moravcsik (1993) as a “more rigorous version of the EC” (Bache and George, 2001, p.13). Moravcsik argued that neofunctionalism failed to provide an accurate account of the developments of the EC. Unlike Hoffman, Moravcsik placed more emphasis on the theoretical background of the EC. Moravcsik suggested that the ‘self-criticism’ of neofunctionalists, had to be identified and analysed. The three areas of self-criticism, which Moravcsik identified, are as follows:
1 European integration theories had to be supplemented by more general theories of national responses to international interdependence.
2 The development of common policy responses needed to be looked at as much as did institutional transfers of competence.
3 Unicausal theories were inadequate to deal with the phenomenon under consideration (more than one theory was needed to understand the complexity of EC policy-making)
The theory of intergovernmentalism was initially proposed by Stanley Hoffmann suggests that national governments control the level and speed of European integration. Any increase in power at supranational level, he argues, results from a direct decision by governments. Hoffman believed that integration, driven by national governments, was often based on the domestic political and economic issues of the day. The theory rejects the concept of the spill-over effect that neofunctionalism proposes. He also rejects the idea that supranational organisations are on an equal level (in terms of political influence) as national governments. The three main components to Hoffman’s critique are follows:
1 According to Hoffman, European integration had to be viewed within a global context. Regional integration was seen by Hoffman to be only one aspect of global development.
2 The government of EU member countries were by Hoffman as being a powerful ‘actor’ in the process of European integration. The national states were guided by their own ‘national interest’.
3 If the national interest of states coincided with one another, governments according to Hoffman would accept some form of integration if it involved the ‘technical functional sectors’. However, this integration would not spread into areas, which are regarded as being part of the ‘high politics’ arena.
Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory was developed by Andrew Moravscik to explain European integration. It is a mix of theories from numerous writers including Putnam, Ruggie and Keohane.
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a reaction against intergovernmentalism theory, which argues that (a) states will only cooperate if they have similar interests, (b) institutions, once created, do not take on a life of their own, and are in fact always subservient to the state, and as such,(c) European integration must be explained in the context of the Cold War.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues differently. It uses the various European integration treaties as independent variables, and European polity as the dependent variable. The explanation for European integration is therefore to be found in the factors that created the treaties.
Moravscik uses a 3-step process to define this. The first 2 steps are similar to Putnam's two-level game, while the third employs elements of regime theory.
1 Domestic Preference Formation is also referred to as policy demand. A variety of actors influence the domestic policy process, including social interest groups, the legisture and the executive. Moravscik feels, based on major decisions in the European integration process, that economic interests are most important.
2 Interstate Bargaining, also called policy supply. Moravscik argues that agreements at this level are the result of asymmetrical interdependence, in other words, the outcomes of international bargaining between states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power of states. There are three determinants of interstate bargaining power:
a) Unilateral policy alternatives, which is the threat of non-agreement. This explains Europe's aquiesence to French demands for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
b) Alternative coalitions are threats of exclusion, that is, a particular party will be left out of the deal. This explains the UK's accaptance of the CAP, as without it, it could not have joined the EC. c) The potential for compromise and issue linkages.
3 Supranational Institutions, once created in Europe, tend to make cooperation more likely for many reasons, including:
a) They reduce transaction costs of negotiations. Once the procedure for negotiations in the EU had been decided, it became unnecessary to decide on them again. This makes all subsequent negotiations easier and less costly than the first negotiation.
b) They make the national government more autonomous from their domestic stakeholders by adding legitimacy and credibility to common policies.
The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is not without its critics. Contrary to Moravcsik's assertion, European integration has not been largely motivated by economic concerns, and instead, it can be argued that that economics and politics cannot be divorced in this context.
For example, the 1950 Shuman Declaration stated that the proposed European Coal and Steel Commuity (ECSC) would make war between France and Germany “materially impossible.” In essence, this agreement was not only about free trade in commodities. Furthermore, Moravcsik does not account for public apathy in national preference formation. For example, only 42% of Spaniards voted in the recent campaign regarding the European constitution. Only 11% of Europeans have actually read the constitution.
Intergovernmentalism was put forward by Hoffman (1964, 1966) as a response to the neofuncationalist approach to European integration. The three main components to Hoffman’s critique are follows:
1 According to Hoffman, European integration had to be viewed within a global context. Regional integration was seen by Hoffman to be only one aspect of global development.
2 The government of EU member countries were by Hoffman as being a powerful ‘actor’ in the process of European integration. The national states were guided by their own ‘national interest’.
3 If the national interest of states coincided with one another, governments according to Hoffman would accept some form of integration if it involved the ‘technical functional sectors’. However, this integration would not spread into areas, which are regarded as being part of the ‘high politics’ arena.
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Liberal intergovernmentalism just as intergovernmentalism was developed as a critique of neofunctionalism. It was put forward by Moravcsik (1993) as a “more rigorous version of the EC” (Bache and George, 2001, p.13). Moravcsik argued that neofunctionalism failed to provide an accurate account of the developments of the EC. Unlike Hoffman, Moravcsik placed more emphasis on the theoretical background of the EC. Moravcsik suggested that the ‘self-criticism’ of neofunctionalists, had to be identified and analysed. The three areas of self-criticism, which Moravcsik identified, are as follows:
1 European integration theories had to be supplemented by more general theories of national responses to international interdependence.
2 The development of common policy responses needed to be looked at as much as did institutional transfers of competence.
3 Unicausal theories were inadequate to deal with the phenomenon under consideration (more than one theory was needed to understand the complexity of EC policy-making)
The theory of intergovernmentalism was initially proposed by Stanley Hoffmann suggests that national governments control the level and speed of European integration. Any increase in power at supranational level, he argues, results from a direct decision by governments. Hoffman believed that integration, driven by national governments, was often based on the domestic political and economic issues of the day. The theory rejects the concept of the spill-over effect that neofunctionalism proposes. He also rejects the idea that supranational organisations are on an equal level (in terms of political influence) as national governments. The three main components to Hoffman’s critique are follows:
1 According to Hoffman, European integration had to be viewed within a global context. Regional integration was seen by Hoffman to be only one aspect of global development.
2 The government of EU member countries were by Hoffman as being a powerful ‘actor’ in the process of European integration. The national states were guided by their own ‘national interest’.
3 If the national interest of states coincided with one another, governments according to Hoffman would accept some form of integration if it involved the ‘technical functional sectors’. However, this integration would not spread into areas, which are regarded as being part of the ‘high politics’ arena.
Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory was developed by Andrew Moravscik to explain European integration. It is a mix of theories from numerous writers including Putnam, Ruggie and Keohane.
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a reaction against intergovernmentalism theory, which argues that (a) states will only cooperate if they have similar interests, (b) institutions, once created, do not take on a life of their own, and are in fact always subservient to the state, and as such,(c) European integration must be explained in the context of the Cold War.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues differently. It uses the various European integration treaties as independent variables, and European polity as the dependent variable. The explanation for European integration is therefore to be found in the factors that created the treaties.
Moravscik uses a 3-step process to define this. The first 2 steps are similar to Putnam's two-level game, while the third employs elements of regime theory.
1 Domestic Preference Formation is also referred to as policy demand. A variety of actors influence the domestic policy process, including social interest groups, the legisture and the executive. Moravscik feels, based on major decisions in the European integration process, that economic interests are most important.
2 Interstate Bargaining, also called policy supply. Moravscik argues that agreements at this level are the result of asymmetrical interdependence, in other words, the outcomes of international bargaining between states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power of states. There are three determinants of interstate bargaining power:
a) Unilateral policy alternatives, which is the threat of non-agreement. This explains Europe's aquiesence to French demands for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
b) Alternative coalitions are threats of exclusion, that is, a particular party will be left out of the deal. This explains the UK's accaptance of the CAP, as without it, it could not have joined the EC. c) The potential for compromise and issue linkages.
3 Supranational Institutions, once created in Europe, tend to make cooperation more likely for many reasons, including:
a) They reduce transaction costs of negotiations. Once the procedure for negotiations in the EU had been decided, it became unnecessary to decide on them again. This makes all subsequent negotiations easier and less costly than the first negotiation.
b) They make the national government more autonomous from their domestic stakeholders by adding legitimacy and credibility to common policies.
The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is not without its critics. Contrary to Moravcsik's assertion, European integration has not been largely motivated by economic concerns, and instead, it can be argued that that economics and politics cannot be divorced in this context.
For example, the 1950 Shuman Declaration stated that the proposed European Coal and Steel Commuity (ECSC) would make war between France and Germany “materially impossible.” In essence, this agreement was not only about free trade in commodities. Furthermore, Moravcsik does not account for public apathy in national preference formation. For example, only 42% of Spaniards voted in the recent campaign regarding the European constitution. Only 11% of Europeans have actually read the constitution.
posted by NDM at 00:22
3 Comments:
Very useful, many thanks.
thanks:)
nice one.
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